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Benjamin Ho Economics PhD, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business
Download my curriculum vitae (CV) in pdf.
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Education
Stanford University Graduate School of Business2001-2006
PhD Economics 2006,MA Education 2004,
MA Political Science 2004
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1996-2000
M.Eng Electrical Engineering and Computer Science 2000,BS Economics 1999,
BS Mathematics 1999,
BS Computer Science 2000
Experience
Vassar College
Assistant Professor of Economics 2011-Cornell University - Johnson School of Management
Assistant Professor of Economics 2006-2011White House - Council of Economic Advisers
Lead Economist for Energy/Transportation 2006-2007Background
Ben Ho is a behavioral economist who uses economic tools like game theory and experiments to understand social systems such as apologies, identity signaling, and climate concerns. Before Vassar, he was an assistant professor of economics at Cornell University’s Johnson School of Management. Professor Ho was also lead energy economist at the White House Council of Economic Advisers, and has worked and consulted for Morgan Stanley and several tech startups.
Publications:
Focal points in coordinated divergence
with Chip Heath and Jonah BergerJournal of Economic Psychology 27 (2006) 635-647
Abstract: We explore situations of coordinated divergence, wherein some people coordinate on a shared cultural practice that diverges from the practice of others. Previous literature on individual drives for uniqueness or difference cannot explain coordinated divergence because it leads to a prediction of idiosyncratic differentiation. Using Schelling's original coordination games as a starting point, we provide experimental evidence that people can effectively solve problems of coordinated divergence. We also discuss why coordinated divergence often takes the form of choosing opposites (long hair/short hair, red/blue, etc.).
The Transportation Sector: Energy and Infrastructure Use
with Ann WolvertonEconomic Report of the President 2007
Apologies as Signals: With Evidence from a Trust Game
Management Science (2012) (Special Issue for Behavioral Economics)Abstract: Apologies are a previously understudied social institution integral in the maintenance of social relationships. Their application ranges from corporate culture to political systems to legal settings. This paper formulates a game theoretic signaling model using rational agents with two-dimensional type that serves as a framework for understanding apologies and their use. An existence result that extends single-crossing is established. The theory is then tested using a novel variant of the trust game experiment, and used to assess the impact of apologies in medical malpractice litigation.
It was suggested that I post my apology poster made from powerpoint as an example for others who have to prepare a conference poster.
Does Sorry Work? The Impact of Apology Laws on Medical Malpractice
with Elaine LiuJournal of Risk and Uncertainty (2011) Volume 43, Number 2, 141-167
Abstract: Legal scholars identify a "vicious cycle" where doctors are trained never to apologize to patients for fear of getting sued, but patients often report that they sued their doctors only because they never received an apology. Legislation in 35 states have made apologies inadmissible in court for civil litigation. Differences in differences estimates find that this potentially policy reduces litigation by over 30% and that the reductions occur in precisely the areas predicted by theory.
Download Working Paper version Here
What’s an Apology Worth? Decomposing the effect of apologies on medical malpractice payments
with Elaine LiuJournal of Empirical Legal Studies December 2011 Vol 8, s1, pp179-199.
Abstract: Past studies find that apologies affect the outcomes of medical malpractce litigation, but such studies have largely been limited to laboratory surveys or case studies. Using Following Ho and Liu (2010) we use the passage of state-level apology laws that exclude apologies from being used as evidence in medical malpractice cases, we and estimate that apologizing to a patient in cases of medical malpractice litigation would reduces the average payout by $31,000. We consider the economicThis paper focuses on the mechanisms by which the apologiesy operates and by looking at sub-samples;, we find that the effect is concentrated on cases involving obstetrics and anesthesia, for cases involving infants, and for cases involving improper performance by the physician rather than on neglect.
Download Working Paper version here
An Alternative Perspective on Inequality and Health
Benjamin Ho and Sita N. Slavov, (2012), Economics Bulletin, Vol. 32 No. 4 pp. 3182-3196with Sita Nataraj
Abstract: While much attention has focused on health disparities between socio-economic groups, most health inequality actually occurs within socio-economic groups. We examine trends in overall health inequality – measured by realized length-of-life inequality – through the lens of social justice, similar to traditional analysis of income inequality. We find that throughout most of the length-of-life distribution, inequality has declined dramatically over the past century. It has continued to decline even in the past 40 years, a period over which it is generally thought that income inequality has risen considerably. Most of the decline in length-of-life inequality appears to be driven by reductions in inequality within socio-economic groups.
Working Papers:
Novelty and Popularity in Markets for News: Theory and empirics on innovation and transfer in the provision of news
with Peter LiuAbstract: Empirical evidence shows that consumers of news care about both the novelty of the news they read, as well as how popular that news topic is with others. We develop a continuous time dynamic model that predicts how news providers invest in covering stories with either high novelty or high popularity, and how this investment depends on the market structure (monopoly, oligopoly, competition). We then seek to test the predictions of the model by examining which stories magazines select for their cover, and how that depends on the novelty and popularity of the topic, by looking at how those stories are covered in daily newspapers. This work has implications on innovation more broadly, specifically novelty and popularity can be thought of as innovation and technology transfer.
Paper available upon request.
Signaling Identity in Social Networks: A Model of Symbolic Consumption
with Jonah Berger and Yogesh JoshiMSI Working Paper 11-104
Abstract: Motivated by experimental evidence, we construct a model of how identity shapes preferences. People consume not only physical goods but also social interaction. Consumers therefore have both intrinsic motivations (preferences for consumption) and extrinsic motivations (how choices impact social interaction) for their choices. Theory demonstrates how the distribution of knowledge in a network, the structure of the social network, the visibility of a good, and the distribution of intrinsic preferences all influence the supply and demand of symbolic goods even when such goods are cheap.
Divergence in Cultural Practices: Tastes as Signals of Identity
with Jonah Berger and Chip HeathAbstract: Divergence is pervasive in social life: people select different tastes to distinguish themselves from others, and they abandon tastes when others adopt them. We propose an identity-signaling approach to divergence; people diverge to signal their identity to facilitate social interactions. Tastes gain value through association with groups or types of individuals, but become diluted when members of more than one type hold them. Consequently, different types of people will diverge in the tastes they select, and they will abandon tastes adopted by members of other social types.
Paper available upon request.
Ethnic Minority Disadvantages in China’s Labor Market?
(Revise and Resubmit - Journal of Development Studies)with Reza Hasmath and Elaine Liu
Abstract: This article estimates wage differentials between ethnic minorities and the Han majority in China from 1989 to 2006. Interviews with minority actors and observations with various enterprises are included. While Han-minority wage differentials estimated with regression analysis show little evidence for minority disadvantages, both quantitative and qualitative evidence looking at the process of minority labor acquisition and retention finds that minorities are disadvantaged in the job search process. The article assesses potential factors for disadvantages in China’s labor market such as discrimination, social network capital and working culture.
Culpability and Willingness to Pay to Reduce Negative Externalities: a Contingent Valuation and Lab Experiment
with John Taber, Greg Poe, Antonio Bento(under review)
Abstract: Recent large-scale field experiments have shown that peer information nudges can have significant effects on behavior, inducing people to reduce their production of negative externalities. Related work in psychology demonstrates that inducing feelings of personal culpability by showing people information about their peers can induce pro-social behavior. This study uses a contingent valuation experiment and a parallel lab experiment to further explore patterns of responses that have been suggested in the emerging literature on norm-based environmental interventions The field–level finding of asymmetric responses between those whose environmental or group impacts are above or below the norm is found to be robust across decision settings. However, substantial heterogeneity in responses to peer information is observed across a number of demographic and other respondent–specific dimensions not able to be explored in large scale field experiments, raising questions about the universality of peer-information effects and the design of such programs.
Optimal Price Instruments in Voluntary Emission Markets
with Antonio Bento and Mario Ramirez BasoraAbstract: We study the problem of an uninformed regulator who wishes to use a voluntary price instrument under varying degrees of uncertainty, specifically in the context of a carbon offset market. In this scenario, a regulator wishes tooffers firms a contract that compensates private agents for producing carbon offsets while at the same time minimize minimizing adverse selection and welfare losses. Our main findings show that the first best is achievable under perfect information or free monitoring. We find that for positive costs of monitoring, we can identify the inefficiencies generated from the additionality problem created by problems of adverse selection, but the net social benefit of an offsets program is always positive.
Paper available upon request.
Trust and the Law
for the Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Lawwith David Huffman
Abstract: Macro studies show that generalized trust in a society is a key component of economic growth, while micro studies show that trust which maintains relational contracts serves as a crucial compelment and substitute to formal laws and enforcement when contracts are incomplete. We survey the literature on how trust maintains informal contracts, and turn to the experimental literature to uncover the mechanisms through which trust operates.
Paper available upon request.
Reversal Aversion
with Zhou XinyueAbstract: Research across disciplines has identified the importance of hierarchy for the organization of human societies. Research into other-regarding preferences have measured the existence and development of preferences for factors such as fairness, altruism, and reciprocity, but not for the preservation of hierarchies. Across cultures and ages we find that humans display an aversion to reversing the rank-ordering of monetary payoffs, and that children develop this aversion to reversals between the ages of 6 and 7.
Paper available upon request.
Work in Progress:
Conscientiousness
with Elaine LiuAbstract: Experiments and theory on conscientiousness.
Legitimacy and Trust
with Reza HasmathAbstract: Experiments and Theory on legitimacy and trust.
Notches and Kinks in the Lab
with Jim Sallee and Joel SlemrodAbstract: We use lab experiments to study the benefits and costs of kinked and notched tax schedules and use the results to estimate a novel model of choice under discontinuous choice sets.
Email:
beho@vassar.edu
Phone:
650-867-8270
Personal Home Page:
http://www.benho.org
Selected Popular Writings and Mentions: (see my CV for more)
NerdWallet blog
Online Lectures on Environmental Economics as part of the facultyproject
Guest Post on NY Times Freakonomics Blog
About me in Seed Magazine
Apologies in Wall Street Journal
On Climate Policy Cornell Magazine
column in chronicle for higher education
column in chronicle for higher education
column in chronicle for higher education